"This is why battlefield dominance alone has become an increasingly unreliable predictor of strategic success."
Meanwhile we just DOGE'd USAID out of existance. Yah that makes perfect sense. A USMA grad exchange cadet from 93 is number 2 at the Thai Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency NEDA. There is a vacuum after USAID and China is happy to fill it in their style of development.
One of many examples is the new highway in Cambodia. Cambodia only has one higway in the entire country.....just one.......newly built with Chinese money. Even with the Khmer Prime MInister being a 99 USMA grad, anything USAID was doing in Cambodia seems a fart in the wind compared to what the Chinese built.
Sean, this is an excellent point—and one that gets to the heart of the argument I was trying to make.
One of the central premises of "compound security" is that strategic competition is no longer won principally through military superiority alone. It increasingly depends on how effectively states integrate **defense, diplomacy, development, and commercial statecraft** over time. When one of those pillars weakens, competitors are often quick to exploit the resulting vacuum.
China has understood this for quite some time. Cambodia is a powerful example. Whatever one thinks of Beijing's intentions, tangible infrastructure projects, financing, and long-term economic engagement create strategic influence that military power alone simply cannot replicate. As you note, once those relationships and networks are established, they become difficult to displace.
Your observation also reminds me of a conversation I hosted in March on *The Civic Brief* with three former U.S. ambassadors. We spent a good portion of the discussion wrestling with the consequences of the dismantling of USAID and, more broadly, what it means for America's developmental and humanitarian lines of effort. The concern wasn't simply about one agency; it was about whether we were voluntarily reducing one of our most effective instruments of long-term strategic competition while competitors were expanding theirs.
None of this diminishes the importance of military strength. Rather, it reinforces the point that battlefield dominance, while necessary, has become an increasingly unreliable predictor of strategic success if it is not paired with credible, sustained investments in governance, development, economic partnerships, and institutional resilience.
That, to me, is one of the defining challenges of competing successfully in the Compound Age.
Provocative piece Ike. Great points and even greater visual aids. The Synchronization v. Orchestration was a great slide to support your narrative.
A “blemish” in one theater does not equate to systemic decline though. History shows superpowers can absorb setbacks while retaining their status (e.g. Vietnam). Resiliency and adaptation capacity is still superior in America. The US retains unmatched global military projection, alliances, economic/financial US dollar dominance and the innovation edge.
I feel Iran’s proxy networks have all been degraded and they are weaker today than they were 5 years or even 6 months ago. Their Nuisance Meter remains pegged with Hormuz, but I do not see them strategically ascending in any realm.
When I look for a failed modern conflict, where the aggressor misreads the compound security problem and comes out far worse off than they were at the start, I can only point to Moscow. Failed strategic objectives of regime change and territory control, coupled with massive losses of personnel and equipment. Ukraine has used your orchestration model to pick up allied support and gains in military/political will.
Overall a thought provoking piece and we will have to continue to rethink what victory looks like in the Compound Age.
Dave, thanks! This is exactly the kind of exchange I hoped the piece would generate.
I actually agree with much of your assessment. America's military remains without peer in its ability to project "force" ('power', more questionably) globally. Our alliance architecture remains extraordinary, the dollar continues to underpin the international financial system, and our innovation ecosystem is still unmatched. None of that is in dispute.
Where we may differ is on **what constitutes strategic success in the emerging Compound Age.** ... and frankly, well beyond and prior to this new 'Age', i.e., what constitutes the measures and metrics of "victory" in War itself; war, being that 'continuation of politics by other means' (acts to compel 'others' to one's will), with "uses of martial force" being one necessary form of war-fare, but never to be(come) the full definitive measure of victory or ... "completion of the thing."
My argument isn't that America is in irreversible decline because of a blemish in only one theater. Frankly, I wish it were limitable to one theater of action. Truly "Great" powers absolutely absorb tactical and even operational setbacks—Vietnam being a classic example—and often emerge stronger. History is full of those cases.
My concern is different. It is that we continue to measure ourselves by an industrial-age conception of military superiority while the character of geopolitical competition has fundamentally changed.
The so-called "forever wars" are perhaps the strongest evidence. Afghanistan and Iraq were not failures because the U.S. military couldn't defeat opposing armies. We did that with remarkable speed. They became strategic disappointments because we consistently proved far better at "winning wars" (battles and engagements; major military operations) than at producing durable political outcomes afterward. Twenty-plus years of continuous campaigning should have forced us to ask whether the problem lay less in execution than in our underlying theory of victory.
That was the central argument of my *Foreign Affairs* essay from July 2023, *"What the U.S. Military Still Hasn't Learned from the War in Iraq."* I wrote:
> "The United States' improved prowess at quickly projecting military force simultaneously, across multiple theaters of conflict, has allowed Washington to continue neglecting questions about how to establish peace once its principal adversary is gone. The irony is stark: the United States' desire to stop its endless wars may be a forlorn quest, because of the country's peerless capacity for endless warfighting."
That paradox, I would argue, is among the clearest indicators that we are arriving late to the next paradigmatic shift.
The present confrontation with Iran illustrates this challenge, but it certainly doesn't define it. We see similar dynamics in the Red Sea, where tactical military actions have struggled to restore strategic commercial confidence; in the Sahel, where repeated counterterrorism successes have coincided with worsening governance and expanding instability; in Syria and Libya, where military gains have failed to produce enduring political settlements; and even in strategic competition with China, where the decisive terrain increasingly includes infrastructure, supply chains, technology, finance, information, and societal resilience as much as traditional military balances.
Likewise, I don't disagree that Russia has suffered an enormous strategic setback in Ukraine. In fact, Moscow's experience reinforces rather than undermines my argument. Russia misread a compound security problem through a largely conventional military lens and has paid an extraordinary price. Yet Ukraine's greatest successes have not come from battlefield performance alone. They have depended upon the orchestration of military, diplomatic, economic, technological, informational, and societal resilience across an extraordinarily broad coalition. That is precisely the distinction I was trying to draw between synchronization and orchestration.
So perhaps we're closer than it first appears.
The question is no longer simply whether America remains the world's preeminent military "force." I believe it does. In fact, we are the world-system "SuperFORCE." Real "Power" is our puzzle.
The more important question is whether our institutions, concepts, and strategic habits have adapted quickly enough -- and in the right and proper vector directions -- to compete in a world where victory depends on orchestrating multiple forms of power simultaneously across interconnected theaters, domains, and time horizons—not merely synchronizing military excellence.
Clausewitz' "supreme judgement "("first, determine the kind of war embarked upon...") and his "supreme warning" are starkly apropos here: "do not divorce the 'military object' from its 'political object' for doing so creates something pointless and devoid of all sense."
Both haunt.
As always, I appreciate you pushing the argument. These conversations make the theory stronger.
"This is why battlefield dominance alone has become an increasingly unreliable predictor of strategic success."
Meanwhile we just DOGE'd USAID out of existance. Yah that makes perfect sense. A USMA grad exchange cadet from 93 is number 2 at the Thai Neighboring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency NEDA. There is a vacuum after USAID and China is happy to fill it in their style of development.
One of many examples is the new highway in Cambodia. Cambodia only has one higway in the entire country.....just one.......newly built with Chinese money. Even with the Khmer Prime MInister being a 99 USMA grad, anything USAID was doing in Cambodia seems a fart in the wind compared to what the Chinese built.
Sean, this is an excellent point—and one that gets to the heart of the argument I was trying to make.
One of the central premises of "compound security" is that strategic competition is no longer won principally through military superiority alone. It increasingly depends on how effectively states integrate **defense, diplomacy, development, and commercial statecraft** over time. When one of those pillars weakens, competitors are often quick to exploit the resulting vacuum.
China has understood this for quite some time. Cambodia is a powerful example. Whatever one thinks of Beijing's intentions, tangible infrastructure projects, financing, and long-term economic engagement create strategic influence that military power alone simply cannot replicate. As you note, once those relationships and networks are established, they become difficult to displace.
Your observation also reminds me of a conversation I hosted in March on *The Civic Brief* with three former U.S. ambassadors. We spent a good portion of the discussion wrestling with the consequences of the dismantling of USAID and, more broadly, what it means for America's developmental and humanitarian lines of effort. The concern wasn't simply about one agency; it was about whether we were voluntarily reducing one of our most effective instruments of long-term strategic competition while competitors were expanding theirs.
None of this diminishes the importance of military strength. Rather, it reinforces the point that battlefield dominance, while necessary, has become an increasingly unreliable predictor of strategic success if it is not paired with credible, sustained investments in governance, development, economic partnerships, and institutional resilience.
That, to me, is one of the defining challenges of competing successfully in the Compound Age.
Provocative piece Ike. Great points and even greater visual aids. The Synchronization v. Orchestration was a great slide to support your narrative.
A “blemish” in one theater does not equate to systemic decline though. History shows superpowers can absorb setbacks while retaining their status (e.g. Vietnam). Resiliency and adaptation capacity is still superior in America. The US retains unmatched global military projection, alliances, economic/financial US dollar dominance and the innovation edge.
I feel Iran’s proxy networks have all been degraded and they are weaker today than they were 5 years or even 6 months ago. Their Nuisance Meter remains pegged with Hormuz, but I do not see them strategically ascending in any realm.
When I look for a failed modern conflict, where the aggressor misreads the compound security problem and comes out far worse off than they were at the start, I can only point to Moscow. Failed strategic objectives of regime change and territory control, coupled with massive losses of personnel and equipment. Ukraine has used your orchestration model to pick up allied support and gains in military/political will.
Overall a thought provoking piece and we will have to continue to rethink what victory looks like in the Compound Age.
Dave, thanks! This is exactly the kind of exchange I hoped the piece would generate.
I actually agree with much of your assessment. America's military remains without peer in its ability to project "force" ('power', more questionably) globally. Our alliance architecture remains extraordinary, the dollar continues to underpin the international financial system, and our innovation ecosystem is still unmatched. None of that is in dispute.
Where we may differ is on **what constitutes strategic success in the emerging Compound Age.** ... and frankly, well beyond and prior to this new 'Age', i.e., what constitutes the measures and metrics of "victory" in War itself; war, being that 'continuation of politics by other means' (acts to compel 'others' to one's will), with "uses of martial force" being one necessary form of war-fare, but never to be(come) the full definitive measure of victory or ... "completion of the thing."
My argument isn't that America is in irreversible decline because of a blemish in only one theater. Frankly, I wish it were limitable to one theater of action. Truly "Great" powers absolutely absorb tactical and even operational setbacks—Vietnam being a classic example—and often emerge stronger. History is full of those cases.
My concern is different. It is that we continue to measure ourselves by an industrial-age conception of military superiority while the character of geopolitical competition has fundamentally changed.
The so-called "forever wars" are perhaps the strongest evidence. Afghanistan and Iraq were not failures because the U.S. military couldn't defeat opposing armies. We did that with remarkable speed. They became strategic disappointments because we consistently proved far better at "winning wars" (battles and engagements; major military operations) than at producing durable political outcomes afterward. Twenty-plus years of continuous campaigning should have forced us to ask whether the problem lay less in execution than in our underlying theory of victory.
That was the central argument of my *Foreign Affairs* essay from July 2023, *"What the U.S. Military Still Hasn't Learned from the War in Iraq."* I wrote:
> "The United States' improved prowess at quickly projecting military force simultaneously, across multiple theaters of conflict, has allowed Washington to continue neglecting questions about how to establish peace once its principal adversary is gone. The irony is stark: the United States' desire to stop its endless wars may be a forlorn quest, because of the country's peerless capacity for endless warfighting."
That paradox, I would argue, is among the clearest indicators that we are arriving late to the next paradigmatic shift.
The present confrontation with Iran illustrates this challenge, but it certainly doesn't define it. We see similar dynamics in the Red Sea, where tactical military actions have struggled to restore strategic commercial confidence; in the Sahel, where repeated counterterrorism successes have coincided with worsening governance and expanding instability; in Syria and Libya, where military gains have failed to produce enduring political settlements; and even in strategic competition with China, where the decisive terrain increasingly includes infrastructure, supply chains, technology, finance, information, and societal resilience as much as traditional military balances.
Likewise, I don't disagree that Russia has suffered an enormous strategic setback in Ukraine. In fact, Moscow's experience reinforces rather than undermines my argument. Russia misread a compound security problem through a largely conventional military lens and has paid an extraordinary price. Yet Ukraine's greatest successes have not come from battlefield performance alone. They have depended upon the orchestration of military, diplomatic, economic, technological, informational, and societal resilience across an extraordinarily broad coalition. That is precisely the distinction I was trying to draw between synchronization and orchestration.
So perhaps we're closer than it first appears.
The question is no longer simply whether America remains the world's preeminent military "force." I believe it does. In fact, we are the world-system "SuperFORCE." Real "Power" is our puzzle.
The more important question is whether our institutions, concepts, and strategic habits have adapted quickly enough -- and in the right and proper vector directions -- to compete in a world where victory depends on orchestrating multiple forms of power simultaneously across interconnected theaters, domains, and time horizons—not merely synchronizing military excellence.
Clausewitz' "supreme judgement "("first, determine the kind of war embarked upon...") and his "supreme warning" are starkly apropos here: "do not divorce the 'military object' from its 'political object' for doing so creates something pointless and devoid of all sense."
Both haunt.
As always, I appreciate you pushing the argument. These conversations make the theory stronger.