This is an interesting piece. On one hand the command team needs to develop a sound strategy to combat ISIL and on the other hand it needs to communicate effectiveness to DC and the world. The problem.... you can't tip your hand to the enemy.
The transparency needed to satisfy the world and the American public would tip the hand majorly giving ISIL the ability to directly counter the strategy. On the other hand, not informing them creates the challenges you laid out.
If not already, the war colleges need to have this as a course. Senior officers need to be able to identify these things well before they run into them. Though... military officers knowing this is only one side of the coin.
Presidential appointees and the diplomatic corp are the other two legs of this three legged stool. If they're not on the same page (especially the presidential appointees) then the chair falls. So that leaves the diplomatic corp and military officers to effectively communicate what the reality is and the strategy needed to the appointees, but as we've seen... egos can get in the way of that.
So that leads to the next question.... how does the system balance an appointee that may have zero true knowledge on a topic and the reality on the ground with.... an appointee who is trying to stir up other thoughts i.e. forcing the diplomatic corps and the military to think outside of their normal box?
You’re right: there is an inherent tradeoff between operational security and strategic transparency. And in a conflict like OIR—where legitimacy, coalition cohesion, and domestic support matter as much as battlefield effects—that tension doesn’t go away. It has to be managed.
But I’d push the frame a bit further.
The issue isn’t just how much to reveal versus how much to conceal.
It’s whether we are communicating the right level of the war.
Too often, we default to:
either tactical disclosure (which risks exposure), or
abstract messaging (which lacks credibility)
What’s required instead is strategic-level communication—clear articulation of:
- how we understand the problem
- what kind of war we are actually fighting
- and what success realistically looks like over time
That doesn’t tip your hand tactically—but it does anchor expectations and legitimacy.
I had a 3+ hour video recorded, on-the-record, oral history interview with the Center of Military History (CMH) on "all of this" relating to the Counter-ISIL/ OIR strategy and mission(s). I took full advantage (and then some!) to "correct the records."
And to your point and suggestion ... yep, I'm planning on converting all this into a multi-module course.
This is an interesting piece. On one hand the command team needs to develop a sound strategy to combat ISIL and on the other hand it needs to communicate effectiveness to DC and the world. The problem.... you can't tip your hand to the enemy.
The transparency needed to satisfy the world and the American public would tip the hand majorly giving ISIL the ability to directly counter the strategy. On the other hand, not informing them creates the challenges you laid out.
If not already, the war colleges need to have this as a course. Senior officers need to be able to identify these things well before they run into them. Though... military officers knowing this is only one side of the coin.
Presidential appointees and the diplomatic corp are the other two legs of this three legged stool. If they're not on the same page (especially the presidential appointees) then the chair falls. So that leaves the diplomatic corp and military officers to effectively communicate what the reality is and the strategy needed to the appointees, but as we've seen... egos can get in the way of that.
So that leads to the next question.... how does the system balance an appointee that may have zero true knowledge on a topic and the reality on the ground with.... an appointee who is trying to stir up other thoughts i.e. forcing the diplomatic corps and the military to think outside of their normal box?
You’re right: there is an inherent tradeoff between operational security and strategic transparency. And in a conflict like OIR—where legitimacy, coalition cohesion, and domestic support matter as much as battlefield effects—that tension doesn’t go away. It has to be managed.
But I’d push the frame a bit further.
The issue isn’t just how much to reveal versus how much to conceal.
It’s whether we are communicating the right level of the war.
Too often, we default to:
either tactical disclosure (which risks exposure), or
abstract messaging (which lacks credibility)
What’s required instead is strategic-level communication—clear articulation of:
- how we understand the problem
- what kind of war we are actually fighting
- and what success realistically looks like over time
That doesn’t tip your hand tactically—but it does anchor expectations and legitimacy.
I had a 3+ hour video recorded, on-the-record, oral history interview with the Center of Military History (CMH) on "all of this" relating to the Counter-ISIL/ OIR strategy and mission(s). I took full advantage (and then some!) to "correct the records."
And to your point and suggestion ... yep, I'm planning on converting all this into a multi-module course.