🔍 Reassessing “Rethinking the Great Game with Iran” in Light of Israel’s 12 June 2025 Decapitation Strikes

— And the Temptation of “Finishing the Job.”

By Dr. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III

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Editor’s Note

Back in February 2025, I published “Rethinking the Great Game with Iran”, arguing that post-October 7 dynamics had opened a rare strategic window to reshape the Middle East’s balance of power. The events of June 12—Israel’s audacious decapitation strikes deep inside Iran—demand a critical reassessment. The following essay revisits that February framework in light of these developments and explores an urgent question now circulating in Israeli and U.S. circles alike: Should this moment of Iranian weakness be seized to pursue full regime change?

Here is my take.

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In February 2025, I argued that the October 7 aftermath had significantly weakened Iran’s proxy network—Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—creating a strategic opening for U.S.–Israel alignment to reshape the Middle East.

That analysis still holds “in tactical terms.”

But Israel’s direct decapitation strikes inside Iran on June 12—and the emerging debate about whether to “complete the work” through regime change—forces us to critically reassess both ends and means.

1. From Proxy Rollback to Regime Targeting

In February, I called for proxy rollback plus regional stabilization. The 12 June strikes moved beyond this framework: Israel targeted senior IRGC command and critical nuclear infrastructure. Iran’s initial retaliatory capabilities proved limited; its proxy network remains degraded; its domestic political structure shows strain.

Thus arises a potent counterfactual temptation in Israeli and some U.S. circles: if now is the moment when Iran is weakest, should the U.S. and Israel push for full regime change? Should we finish the job?

2. The Case for “Completing the Work”

Pros:

• Strategic elimination of Iran as a revisionist power: No return to proxy war or nuclear breakout.

• Potentially stabilizes Gulf–Levant region: Removes a key driver of asymmetric conflict.

• Signals U.S.–Israel strategic dominance: Deters other hostile actors across the region.

Cons:

• High escalation risk: Direct military regime change would almost certainly fracture the region further and trigger asymmetric retaliation (globally and across the cyber domain).

• Legitimacy and political vacuum: Iran’s domestic opposition is not ready to fill the void; a U.S.–Israeli-imposed solution could trigger enduring insurgency, further destabilizing Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf.

• Global backlash: U.S. regional partners (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) oppose full military regime change; Europe would fracture politically over such an approach.

• Compound Security Risk: As I warned in February, unchecked military success without political architecture creates pyrrhic outcomes. The collapse of the Iranian state could unleash waves of refugee flows, empower extremist actors within Iran, and invite further great power competition (Russia/China seeking influence over post-regime Iran).

3. Strategic Recommendation: From Temptation to Tempered Statecraft

Given the current balance, the wiser course is not full regime change through direct military force—but:

• Maintain pressure: Continue to degrade IRGC capabilities and disrupt proxy regeneration.

• Support internal Iranian reformist forces: Bolster political alternatives within Iran without imposing external governance.

• Build regional security architecture: Deepen U.S.–Gulf–Israel cooperation, but ground it in defensive deterrence and diplomatic containment.

• Guard against vacuum: Prepare for stability operations in case of unintended Iranian state collapse—but do not make collapse the policy goal.

4. Conclusion: “Finishing the Job”—But How?

Strategic patience beats reckless triumphalism. Yes, Iran’s proxies are weakened. Yes, Tehran’s leadership is destabilized. But history shows that forced regime change often produces complex security spirals (see Iraq, 2003). Compound security dynamics teach us: the hardest part is not winning the war, but shaping the peace.

Thus, the wiser path forward is a calibrated “2D+C” approach:

• Defensive deterrence

• Diplomatic containment

• Commercial and ideological engagement

Finish the job—but finish it through statecraft, not just airpower.

If we remember this, the 12 June strikes can be a lever for regional transformation—not a prelude to the next spiral of conflict.

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Dr. Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III
Founder & CEO, Wilson W.i.S.E. Consulting LLC
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.) | Former DOD Senior Civilian Executive
President Emeritus, Joint Special Operations University
Professor of Practice, Arizona State University