Timely and necessary discussion that we need, RIGHT NOW. Designing an off-ramp is exactly the hard work most strategy writing avoids.
Today's WSJ reporting highlights that Iran is not treating Hormuz reopening as a neutral restoration. Hard-liners are explicitly linking safe passage for commercial traffic to restrictions on the U.S. Navy presence.
Wow.
In other words, the “off-ramp” Tehran appears willing to offer is one in which American military power leaves the Gulf so that everyone else can transit.
First Kabul, now this. We keep designing exits that adversaries interpret as the strategic prize itself. If the price of an open Hormuz is a diminished U.S. security architecture in the Gulf, is that an off-ramp or simply a managed concession dressed up as strategy?
Dave — yes. And I think you’ve put your finger on precisely the danger that has to be guarded against.
An off-ramp cannot mean giving the adversary through negotiation the strategic prize it could not otherwise obtain through force. If Tehran’s price for reopening Hormuz is effectively the displacement of U.S. military power from the Gulf, then I would not regard that as the kind of off-ramp I’m arguing for. That risks becoming strategic concession masquerading as war termination.
Where I might push back slightly on the Kabul analogy is that this outcome is not inevitable. The key is separating ending this war from abandoning the competitive space in which the war occurred. My argument is not that we leave the Gulf or terminate competition with Iran. Quite the opposite: we need to move from an increasingly open-ended warfighting paradigm into one of sustainable deterrence and managed competition—while retaining the capability, access, alliances, and freedom of action necessary to enforce it.
That is also why I think Hormuz should be compartmentalized. The immediate bargain should be narrow: commercial shipping moves safely and predictably. Full stop. Tehran’s larger ambition to leverage that bargain into determining the future U.S. security architecture of the Gulf is a separate question—and one on which Washington should not casually bargain away its position.
So I think your challenge actually sharpens the central test for any proposed off-ramp: Does it convert military leverage into a sustainable political advantage, or merely exchange cessation of hostilities for an adversary’s strategic objective?
If it is the latter, it isn’t an off-ramp worth taking.
And regarding the latter, Israel should do so not merely for Palestinians, nor simply as a matter of restitution for civilian loss and suffering, but as much or more for Israel itself—for the preservation of its own democratic soul, legitimacy, and ultimately its security.
Ex gratia payments do not undo death, injury, displacement, or destruction. Nor do they necessarily constitute an admission of legal liability. What they can do is acknowledge that innocent human beings suffered consequences from the exercise of military power and that those exercising that power retain a moral responsibility toward them.
That mattered to us in Iraq and Afghanistan, imperfectly as we practiced it. It matters even more in Gaza. A democracy cannot measure strategic success only by what it destroys or whom it defeats. It must also remain attentive to what the exercise of its power is doing to its own character and legitimacy.
Ike,
Timely and necessary discussion that we need, RIGHT NOW. Designing an off-ramp is exactly the hard work most strategy writing avoids.
Today's WSJ reporting highlights that Iran is not treating Hormuz reopening as a neutral restoration. Hard-liners are explicitly linking safe passage for commercial traffic to restrictions on the U.S. Navy presence.
Wow.
In other words, the “off-ramp” Tehran appears willing to offer is one in which American military power leaves the Gulf so that everyone else can transit.
First Kabul, now this. We keep designing exits that adversaries interpret as the strategic prize itself. If the price of an open Hormuz is a diminished U.S. security architecture in the Gulf, is that an off-ramp or simply a managed concession dressed up as strategy?
WSJ: https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-sees-an-opening-to-kick-the-u-s-out-of-the-gulf-b9f9cc53
Dave — yes. And I think you’ve put your finger on precisely the danger that has to be guarded against.
An off-ramp cannot mean giving the adversary through negotiation the strategic prize it could not otherwise obtain through force. If Tehran’s price for reopening Hormuz is effectively the displacement of U.S. military power from the Gulf, then I would not regard that as the kind of off-ramp I’m arguing for. That risks becoming strategic concession masquerading as war termination.
Where I might push back slightly on the Kabul analogy is that this outcome is not inevitable. The key is separating ending this war from abandoning the competitive space in which the war occurred. My argument is not that we leave the Gulf or terminate competition with Iran. Quite the opposite: we need to move from an increasingly open-ended warfighting paradigm into one of sustainable deterrence and managed competition—while retaining the capability, access, alliances, and freedom of action necessary to enforce it.
That is also why I think Hormuz should be compartmentalized. The immediate bargain should be narrow: commercial shipping moves safely and predictably. Full stop. Tehran’s larger ambition to leverage that bargain into determining the future U.S. security architecture of the Gulf is a separate question—and one on which Washington should not casually bargain away its position.
So I think your challenge actually sharpens the central test for any proposed off-ramp: Does it convert military leverage into a sustainable political advantage, or merely exchange cessation of hostilities for an adversary’s strategic objective?
If it is the latter, it isn’t an off-ramp worth taking.
Sir,
Did your unit ever pay ex gratia payments? Even more important should Israel pay ex gratia in Gaza now?
Sean — yes, and yes they should.
And regarding the latter, Israel should do so not merely for Palestinians, nor simply as a matter of restitution for civilian loss and suffering, but as much or more for Israel itself—for the preservation of its own democratic soul, legitimacy, and ultimately its security.
Ex gratia payments do not undo death, injury, displacement, or destruction. Nor do they necessarily constitute an admission of legal liability. What they can do is acknowledge that innocent human beings suffered consequences from the exercise of military power and that those exercising that power retain a moral responsibility toward them.
That mattered to us in Iraq and Afghanistan, imperfectly as we practiced it. It matters even more in Gaza. A democracy cannot measure strategic success only by what it destroys or whom it defeats. It must also remain attentive to what the exercise of its power is doing to its own character and legitimacy.
So, yes—and yes they should.